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# Off

#### Oil prices will stay high

Whipple, 9/5

Tom Whipple is one of the most highly respected analysts of peak oil issues in the United States. A retired 30-year CIA analyst who has been following the peak oil story since 1999, Tom is the editor of the daily Peak Oil News and the weekly Peak Oil Review, both published by the Association for the Study of Peak Oil-USA. He is also a weekly columnist on peak oil issues for the Falls Church News Press. Tom has degrees from Rice University and the London School of Economics. “Peak Oil Crisis – Middle East Context,” 9/5/13, <http://www.resilience.org/stories/2013-09-05/the-peak-oil-crisis-middle-east-context> //BGHS-IS

Few of the Middle East’s manifold problems are so dramatic that they warrant much media attention, but taken together they are slowly taking a toll on the world’s oil supply. Last week the US’s Energy Information Administration reported that unplanned production and export outages, mostly in the Middle East, are now up to 2.8 million b/d and this was before the recent Libyan crisis took another 500,000 b/d off the market. Despite all the hype about America’s shale oil production, it still amounts to well less than half the unplanned drop in Middle Eastern production. The International Energy Agency reported that production shortfalls this summer resulted in the world consuming about 2.2 million b/d more than it produced with the remainder coming from inventories. These are now thought to be down about 95 million barrels from recent levels. World oil prices are now about $115 a barrel. Some of this is due to concerns about what will happen if we start bombing Syria, but the rest is due to slowly tightening supply/demand situation around the world. The Chinese are still growing their demand at prodigious rates and the world is still adding about 70 million new “oil consumers” to its population each year. Anyone who thinks that a short-lived burst of shale oil fracking in North Dakota and Texas is enough to counter the tides of history flowing across the Middle East simply does not understand the situation.

#### **An increase in Cuban oil production would lower prices—2007 proves**

Garcia, 7 (Hugo Garcia, journalist for Juventud Rebelde, Juventud Rebeldge, 12/27/07, "Cuba Pumping Over 28 Million Barrels of Oil Annually", www.juventudrebelde.co.cu/cuba/2007-12-27/cuba-pumping-over-28-million-barrels-of-oil-annually/)

Cárdenas.— Cuba’s volume of oil and natural gas production will reach four million tons —28.8 million barrels— this year for just the third time in its history. “This has been a good year for the Cuban oil industry,” said Carlos Lage Dávila, secretary of the Executive Committee of the Council of Ministers, at a ceremony marking the one millionth ton of oil produced by the Matanzas Central Oil Drilling and Extraction Company (EPEP-C). Lage noted that the last time production reached this mark was in 2003, and stated that in order to maintain and increase production, the drilling of a large number of new wells is needed —as well as a little bit of luck— given the natural depletion of existing wells. Accompanied by Basic Industry Minister Yadira García, and Pedro Betancourt, the first secretary of the provincial party organization, Lage said, “the country has already fulfilled its hydrocarbon production plan, with gas production plan having been exceeded and the crude oil production expected to be met by December 30. However, as the gas production projections were surpassed by 11 percent, the annual plan has already been met.” The national official explained that depletion of wells leads to higher oil prices and said that given the current world market —with oil prices above $90 a barrel— the decision was made to secure new drilling rigs and give priority to this sector of economy to **stem declining production rates**. “We have already started to see the fruits of this policy and decision made by comrade Fidel Castro, which are now more clear and evident than ever,” he said. Among the year’s highlights is an increase in crude production along with the utilization of 97 percent of the associated gas produced, which virtually eliminates environmental contamination from associated gas released into the air.

#### High oil prices key to Central Asian stability

Sieff, 10

Martin Sieff is Chief Global Analyst at The Globalist Research Center and Editor-at-Large at The Globalist. For the past decade, he has been chief news analyst for United Press International and is its former Managing Editor for International Affairs. He has received three Pulitzer Prize nominations for international reporting. Mr. Sieff has covered conflicts in his native Northern Ireland, Israel and the West Bank, Indonesia, Bosnia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and the Baltic states. He has also reported from China, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Kazakhstan, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, Syria, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Turkey and more than 40 other nations. From 1994 to 1999, Mr. Sieff was Chief Foreign Correspondent for The Washington Times. He was the paper's Soviet and East European correspondent covering the collapse of communism for six years from 1986 to 1992 and from 1992 to 1994 its State Department correspondent. He has appeared as an expert on Asian security affairs and the Middle East on National Public Radio, the Fox News Channel and C-SPAN. Mr. Sieff received his B.A. and M.A in modern history from Oxford University in 1972 and 1976. He did graduate work in Middle East studies at the London School of Economics from 1973 to 1976. “High oil prices to fund expansion, buy stability,” 11/11/10, http://www.universalnewswires.com/centralasia/viewstory.aspx?id=2309

It's official: Oil prices will hit a plateau of more than $100 per barrel by 2015 and base prices will double to between $160-$180 per barrel by 2035. That was the forecast published Wednesday by the Paris-based International Energy Agency (IEA). And as a British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) commentator quickly pointed out, what the IEA was really doing was saying as clearly as possible that the days of cheap energy are over. The implications of this assessment are enormous, and are particularly momentous for Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan -- the three major energy-exporting powers of Central Asia. This” IEA policy assessment effectively confirms the wisdom, and predicts the success, of Kazakhstan's most important national economic policies: -- Kazakhstan’s gamble to rapidly expand its oil production capabilities. -- Its decision to join Russia in a new customs union that was widely criticized in the West. -- Its huge investment in high-tech, industrial and agricultural development and expansion over the next 20 years in its 2030 plan. All of these programs risk floundering spectacularly if some major global economic recession or other dislocation causes the price of oil to come plunging down rapidly for long periods of time. That would even be even more the case if future U.S. administrations could actually translate the repeated rhetoric of American energy independence into reality. But the IEA clearly came to the conclusion that this isn't going to happen. A guaranteed high platform for global oil prices is also more than good news for neighboring Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan: It is virtually a guarantee of social and political survival to them. Both nations have populations with much lower standards of living than Kazakhstan's. And it is a particular challenge to raise the standard of living in Uzbekistan, which President Islam Karimov this year affirmed as a major national priority. That is because Uzbekistan has the largest population in Central Asia -- almost double that of Kazakhstan's -- crowded into a far smaller area. Also, the continued strong state regulations and control of major economic institutions remains a major barrier to the kind of rapid economic expansion Kazakhstan has enjoyed next door. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan also have good reason to feel threatened by the growing instability and threats of civil war -- and even worse, chaotic anarchy -- threatening to develop in neighboring Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. However, continued high and rising global oil and energy prices will give the governments in Ashgabat and Tashkent the crucial checkbook power they need to buy and distribute enough food to their people, keep wages stable and subsidies high. Modern history throughout the Middle East, southern and Southeast Asia and other parts of the world repeatedly documents that as long as governments can retain that financial power, with enough confidence and competence to use it, they can keep their populations happy, or at least relatively content.

#### Central Asian instability leads to nuclear war

**McDermott 11** - specializes in Russian and Central Asian defense and security issues and is a Senior Fellow in Eurasian Military Studies, The Jamestown Foundation, Washington DC, Senior International Research Fellow for the Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and Affiliated Senior Analyst, Danish Institute for International Studies, Copenhagen. McDermott is on the editorial board of Central Asia and the Caucasus and the scientific board of the Journal of Power Institutions in Post-Soviet Societies. He recently wrote The Reform of Russia’s Conventional Armed Forces: Problems, Challenges and Policy Implications (Roger, “General Makarov Highlights the “Risk” of Nuclear Conflict”, 12/6/11, The Jamestown Foundation, <http://www.jamestown.org/details/?tx_bzdstaffdirectory_pi1%5BshowUid%5D=140&tx_bzdstaffdirectory_pi1%5BbackPid%5D=60&no_cache=1>)//GP

In the current election season the Russian media has speculated that the Defense Minister Anatoliy Serdyukov may be replaced, possibly by Dmitry Rogozin, Russia’s Ambassador to NATO, which masks deeper anxiety about the future direction of the Armed Forces. The latest rumors also partly reflect uncertainty surrounding how the switch in the ruling tandem may reshuffle the pack in the various ministries, as well as concern about managing complex processes in Russian defense planning. On November 17, Russia’s Chief of the General Staff, Army-General Nikolai Makarov, offered widely reported comments on the potential for nuclear conflict erupting close to the country’s borders. His key observation was controversial, based on estimating that the potential for armed conflict along the entire Russian periphery had grown dramatically over the past twenty years (Profil, December 1; Moskovskiy Komsomolets, November 28; Interfax, November 17). During his speech to the Defense Ministry’s Public Council on the progress and challenges facing the effort to reform and modernize Russia’s conventional Armed Forces, Makarov linked the potential for local or regional conflict to escalate into large-scale warfare “possibly even with nuclear weapons.” Many Russian commentators were bewildered by this seemingly “alarmist” perspective. However, they appear to have misconstrued the general’s intention, since he was actually discussing conflict escalation (Interfax, ITAR-TASS, November 17; Moskovskiy Komsomolets, Krasnaya Zvezda, November 18). Makarov’s remarks, particularly in relation to the possible use of nuclear weapons in war, were quickly misinterpreted. Three specific aspects of the context in which Russia’s most senior military officer addressed the issue of a potential risk of nuclear conflict may serve to necessitate wider dialogue about the dangers of escalation. There is little in his actual assertion about the role of nuclear weapons in Russian security policy that would suggest Moscow has revised this; in fact, Makarov stated that this policy is outlined in the 2010 Military Doctrine, though he understandably made no mention of its classified addendum on nuclear issues (Kommersant, November 18). Russian media coverage was largely dismissive of Makarov’s observations, focusing on the idea that he may have represented the country as being surrounded by enemies. According to Kommersant, claiming to have seen the materials used during his presentation, armed confrontation with the West could occur partly based on the “anti-Russian policy” pursued by the Baltic States and Georgia, which may equally undermine Moscow’s future relations with NATO. Military conflict may erupt in Central Asia, caused by instability in Afghanistan or Pakistan; or western intervention against a nuclear Iran or North Korea; energy competition in the Arctic or foreign inspired “color revolutions” similar to the Arab Spring and the creation of a European Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system that could undermine Russia’s strategic nuclear deterrence also featured in this assessment of the strategic environment (Kommersant, November 18). Since the reform of Russia’s conventional Armed Forces began in late 2008, Makarov has consistently promoted adopting network-centric capabilities to facilitate the transformation of the military and develop modern approaches to warfare. Keen to displace traditional Russian approaches to warfare, and harness military assets in a fully integrated network, Makarov possibly more than any senior Russian officer appreciates that the means and methods of modern warfare have changed and are continuing to change (Zavtra, November 23; Interfax, November 17). The contours of this evolving and unpredictable strategic environment, with the distinctions between war and peace often blurred, interface precisely in the general’s expression of concern about nuclear conflict: highlighting the risk of escalation. However, such potential escalation is linked to the reduced time involved in other actors deciding to intervene in a local crisis as well as the presence of network-centric approaches among western militaries and being developed by China and Russia. From Moscow’s perspective, NATO “out of area operations” from Kosovo to Libya blur the traditional red lines in escalation; further complicated if any power wishes to pursue intervention in complex cases such as Syria. Potential escalation resulting from local conflict, following a series of unpredictable second and third order consequences, makes Makarov’s comments seem more understandable; it is not so much a portrayal of Russia surrounded by “enemies,” as a recognition that, with weak conventional Armed Forces, in certain crises Moscow may have few options at its disposal (Interfax, November 17). There is also the added complication of a possibly messy aftermath of the US and NATO drawdown from Afghanistan and signs that the Russian General Staff takes Central Asian security much more seriously in this regard. The General Staff cannot know whether the threat environment in the region may suddenly change. Makarov knows the rather limited conventional military power Russia currently possesses, which may compel early nuclear first use likely involving sub-strategic weapons, in an effort to “de-escalate” an escalating conflict close to Russia’s borders. Moscow no longer primarily fears a theoretical threat of facing large armies on its western or eastern strategic axes; instead the information-era reality is that smaller-scale intervention in areas vital to its strategic interests may bring the country face-to-face with a network-centric adversary capable of rapidly exploiting its conventional weaknesses. As Russia plays catch-up in this technological and revolutionary shift in modern warfare capabilities, the age-old problem confronts the General Staff: the fastest to act is the victor (See EDM, December 1). Consequently, Makarov once again criticized the domestic defense industry for offering the military inferior quality weapons systems. Yet, as speed and harnessing C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) become increasingly decisive factors in modern warfare, the risks for conflict escalation demand careful attention – especially when the disparate actors possess varied capabilities. Unlike other nuclear powers, Russia has to consider the proximity of several nuclear actors close to its borders. In the coming decade and beyond, Moscow may pursue dialogue with other nuclear actors on the nature of conflict escalation and de-escalation. However, with a multitude of variables at play ranging from BMD, US Global Strike capabilities, uncertainty surrounding the “reset” and the emergence of an expanded nuclear club, and several potential sources of instability and conflict, any dialogue must consider escalation in its widest possible context. Makarov’s message during his presentation, as far as the nuclear issue is concerned, was therefore a much tougher bone than the old dogs of the Cold War would wish to chew on.

# Off

#### The United States federal government should

#### -develop space weapons in low earth orbit beyond the Earth’s mesosphere

#### -create a prize system for electricity production of space solar power in the United States.

#### Space weapons are key to prevent nuclear terrorism because they allow precise and immediate retaliation

Dolman and Cooper 11 (Everett, PhD and Professor of Comparative Military Studies @ US Air Force School of Advanced Air and Space Studies and Recipient of Central Intelligence’s Outstanding Intelligence Analyst Award, and Henry, PhD and Former Deputy for the Strategic and Space Systems, “Chapter 19: Increasing the Military Uses of Space,” Part of “Toward a Theory of Spacepower,” Edited by Charles Lutes and Peter Hays, National Defense University Press, http://www.ndu.edu/press/lib/pdf/spacepower/spacepower.pdf, EMM)

Terrorism in the form of limited, low-technology attacks is the most likely direct threat against America and its allies today, and space support is enabling the most sophisticated response ever seen. All-source intelligence has foiled dozens of attacks by al Qaeda and its associates. But what of the most dangerous threats today? Weapons of mass destruction, particularly nuclear but also chemical and biological ones, could be delivered in a variety of means vulnerable to interception if knowledge of their location is achieved in time for counteroperations to be effective. In situations where there is no defense available, or the need for one has not been anticipated, then time is the most precious commodity. A limited strike capability from space would allow for the engagement of the highest threat and the most fleeting targets wherever they presented themselves on the globe, regardless of the intention of the perpetrator. The case of a ballistic missile carrying nuclear warheads is exemplary. Two decades ago, the most dangerous threat facing America (and the world) was a massive exchange of nuclear warheads that could destroy all life on the planet. Since a perfect defense was not achievable, negotiators agreed to no defense at all, on the assumption that reasonable leaders would restrain themselves from global catastrophe. Today, a massive exchange is less likely than at any period of the Cold War, in part because of significant reductions in the primary nations' nuclear arsenals. The most likely and most dangerous threat comes from a single or limited missile launch, and from sources that are unlikely to be either rational or predictable. The first is an accidental launch, a threat we avoided making protections against due to the potentially destabilizing effect on the precarious Cold War balance. That an accidental launch, by definition undeterrable, would today hit its target is almost incomprehensible. More likely than an accidental launch is the intentional launch of one or a few missiles, either by a nonstate actor (a terrorist or "rogue boat captain" as the scenario was described in the early 1980s) or a rogue state attempting to maximize damage as a prelude to broader conflict. This is especially likely in the underdeveloped theories pertaining to deterring third-party states. The United States can do nothing today to prevent India from launching a nuclear attack against Pakistan (or vice versa) except threaten retaliation. If Iran should launch a nuclear missile at Israel, or in a preemptory strike Israel should attempt the reverse, America and the world could only sit back and watch, hoping that a potentially world-destroying conflict did not spin out of control.

#### SPS solves all future emissions

**Taylor 12** (Rupert Taylor, editor of International Affairs; “Harvesting Solar Power Closer to the Source,” 5/7/2012, http://suite101.com/article/harvesting-solar-power-closer-to-the-source-a407280)

And Scientific American (March 2011) chimes in with some other astounding numbers: “If humanity could capture one tenth of one percent of the solar energy striking the Earth – one part in one thousand – we would have access to six times as much energy as we consume in all forms today, with almost **no greenhouse gas emissions**.” In recent decades, solar energy has become more attractive because, unlike fossil fuels, it’s clean and there’s an endless supply. Well, almost endless. Astronomers say the Sun will run out of juice in about 4.5 billion years. Efficiency of Current Solar Technologies Solar radiation can be converted directly into electricity by photovoltaic (PV) cells. But today’s PV cells are only about 20 percent efficient (only that fraction of the radiant energy received is converted to electrical energy); this is an improvement on earlier cells and the technology is getting better all the time. The other way of capturing solar energy is to use it to heat a liquid, usually water. A variety of designs have been produced to use the Sun to warm up water and then transfer this heat to other uses. Typically, panels have loops of water-filled tubing in them. These are set out in a sunny location, usually on a roof, and the heated water circulated by means of a pump. The hot water can then be put through radiators and under-floor heating systems to warm a dwelling. The hot water can also be used for laundry, dishwashing, and the morning shower. This technology is only useful as a supplement to traditional home heating in countries such as Canada. It may supply 15 to 25 percent of a home’s hot water needs. Space-based Solar Power To overcome some of the inefficiencies of Earth-based technologies scientists are looking into capturing solar radiation in space before it enters the atmosphere. The energy might then be converted to some other form and transmitted to Earth. (Beam me down Scotty?) According to Neil Reynolds (Globe and Mail, April 2010), “Japan leads the way with its ambitious program to collect solar energy in space, convert it into electromagnetic microwaves and deliver it wirelessly to precise locations on Earth.” A group of 16 companies under the leadership of Mitsubishi plans to have a space-based power station up and running in 2030. It is supposed to provide electricity to 300,000 homes in Tokyo. The numbers on this type of project are mind-blowing. First a collector array has to be lobbed into space, as much as 36,000 km from Earth. Then a collector panel about one square kilometre in size is unfolded. This, says the U.S. Defence Department’s National Security Space Office, can scoop up solar energy “equal to the energy contained in all of the known recoverable conventional oil reserves on Earth today.” According to John Mankins, President of the Space Power Association, a single space-based solar energy satellite could produce “40 to a 100 times more energy than” a typical gas-fired generating station.

# Off

#### Interpretation: Removing selective restrictions on specific goods isn’t “economic” because it doesn’t broadly affect economic life

Davidsson 3 – Elias Davidsson, Human Rights Researcher and Activist, Reporter for the Arab American News, Contributing Editor for Global Research, “The Mechanism of Economic Sanctions: Changing Perceptions and Euphemisms”, November, www.aldeilis.net/english/attachments/2877\_econsanc-debate.pdf‎

“Economic sanctions”, a mode of coercion in international relations resuscitated in recent years, has prompted renewed and lively scholarly interest in the subject. Why have such measures become so popular? One answer is that they “constitute a means of exerting international influence that is more powerful than diplomatic mediation but lies below the threshold of military intervention”[1]. Another answer is that “they engage comparatively less internal political resistance than other candidate strategies [...]. They do not generate sombre processions of body bags bringing home the mortal remains of the sons and daughters of constituents”[2], in other words, they cost little to the side imposing the sanctions. The notable predilection by the United States for economic sanctions [3], suggests that such a tool is particularly useful for economically powerful states that are themselves relatively immune to such measures. This tool of collective economic coercion, with antecedents such as siege warfare and blockade going back to biblical time [4], was used during most of the 20th Century, particularly in war situations. Although the United Nations Charter, drafted during the later stages of World War II, includes provisions for the imposition of economic sanctions (Article 41), the Security Council - empowered to resort to this tool - only used it twice between 1945 and 1990, against Rhodesia in 1966 and South Africa in 1977. In our discussion we designate economic sanctions as “coordinated restrictions on trade and/or financial transactions intended to impair economic life within a given territory”[5]. To the extent that measures intend to impair “economic life within a given territory” through restrictions on trade and/or finance, they constitute, for our purposes, *economic* sanctions. Selective or individualized measures, such as restrictions on specific goods (arms, luxury items, some forms of travel), are therefore not considered as *economic* sanctions. Symbolic economic deprivations, such as partial withholding of aid, do not amount to economic sanctions if their intended effect is primarily to convey displeasure, rather than to affect the economy.

#### Violation – the aff removes sanctions on a specific good – oil

# Case

## Spills

#### No drilling in the squo – this takes out any timeframe on this flow

O’Grady ‘13

Mary O'Grady is a member of the editorial board at The Wall Street Journal – WSJ – April 24, 2013 – http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324474004578442511561458392.html

Then came promises of an oil boom and last week the predictable bust. The Brazilian state-owned Petrobras PETR4.BR +1.01% had given up on deep-sea drilling in Cuban waters in 2011. Repsol REP.MC -2.46% gave up in May 2012. The deep water platform it was using was then passed to Malaysia's state-owned Petronas, which also came up empty. Venezuela's PdVSA had no luck either. In November Cuba announced that the rig that had been in use would be heading to Asia. Last week came the end of shallow-water drilling.

#### The US is key to any successful drilling in Cuba

Tim Padgett, 2008 (staff writer, TIME, Oct. 23, 2008. Retrieved Apr. 21, 2013 from <http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1853252,00.html>, Accessed 7/19/2013, rwg)

Still, the concessions so far represent less than a quarter of the 59 drilling blocks that Cuba hopes to exploit in the 43,000-sq.-mi. (112,000 sq km) EEZ. Analysts say one reason is the daunting infrastructural difficulties facing any company that drills in Cuba: firms have to bring much more of their own capital, equipment, technology and on-the-ground know-how than usual. This year's severe hurricane damage in Cuba has made the situation worse. Canada's Sherritt, in fact, recently dropped out of its four-block contract. "Who else is going to be willing to actually come in and take the risk in Cuba?" says Benjamin-Alvarado. "In terms of proximity and technology, the only people really able to do it to the extent the Cubans need are the Americans."

#### Oil drilling destroys coral by damaging reproductive tissue and inhibiting coral recruitment.

**Burk and Maidens, 5**

**Burke and Maidens,** associaties in the People and Ecosystems Program of the World Resources Institute, argue in August **2005.** Lauretta Burke and Jonathan Maidens. “Reefs at Risk in the Caribbean.” World Resources Institute, August 2005. <http://earthtrends.wri.org/features/view_feature.php?theme=1&fid=55> accessed 11-15-08. //WC

Marine-based sources of pollution, including oil discharge and spills, sewage, ballast and bilge discharge, and the dumping of other human garbage and waste from ship, are a cause for great concern in the Caribbean region. Much of this threat is related to the high amount of marine transportation in the Caribbean. For example, ship anchors can extensively damage the seafloor; discharge from ships releases a toxic mix of oil, nutrients, invasive species, and other pollutants. The routine maintenance and washing of oil tanks, drilling rigs, and pipelines releases a significant amount of oil into the environment. Oil damages coral reproductive tissues, harms zooxanthellae (algae that lives symbiotically inside corals), inhibits juvenile coral recruitment, and reduces the resilience of reefs to other stresses (Dubinsky and Stambler, 1996).

#### Cuba's coral reefs contain a unique ecosystem that is critical for biodiversity for the whole region.

**Environmental Defense Fund, 4**

**Environmental Defense Fund, 2004.** “Cuba: A Jewel of Marine Biodiversity.” 10/15/2004. [[<http://www.edf.org/article.cfm?ContentID=2237>](http://www.edf.org/article.cfm?ContentID=2237)](http://www.edf.org/article.cfm?ContentID=2237) accessed 11-15-08. //WC

Located where the Caribbean Sea, Gulf of Mexico and Atlantic Ocean meet, Cuba is the largest island in the Caribbean. Its coastal waters are strung with islets and keys, and its massive reef tracts (three of which equal or exceed the Florida Keys) provide spawning grounds for multitudes of snappers, groupers, lobsters and corals. This unique ecosystem has remained relatively undisturbed but now faces increasing threats from coastal development, tourism and overfishing. Because of the prevailing currents and its proximity to neighboring countries, preserving this hot spot of Caribbean biodiversity is important for other biologically rich marine areas in the region.

#### Sanctions won’t block US safety response – Helix proves.

Bolstad ‘12

Erika Bolstad is a reporter who covers Washington for the Anchorage Daily News, the Idaho Statesman and McClatchy Newspapers. This evidence internally quotes Lee Hunt, the former president of the International Association of Drilling Contractors. Hunt, in this instance, is arguably not biased in favor of drilling, as he is speaking to safety and clean-up regimes and he is speaking before a liberal think-tank in favor of human rights – McClatchy Newspapers – May 10, 2012 – http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2012/05/10/148433/cuba-embargo-could-threaten-oil.html#.UaoUWpyADq0

Several of the experts said Thursday they are confident that the Treasury Department could react quickly in an emergency to allow U.S. oil response teams to get emergency permits to do business with the Cuban government.¶ The department, which oversees the embargo, has authorized an American firm, Helix Energy Solutions, to handle spill response for Repsol. It’s a red-tape ordeal that company officials said they’ll have to repeat when working with the other companies that have contracted to use the same rig next in Cuban waters.

**No extinction - tech has decoupled humanity for the environment**

**Science Daily 10**

Science Daily, reprinted from materials provided by American Institute of Biological Sciences, September 1, 2010, "Human Well-Being Is Improving Even as Ecosystem Services Decline: Why?", http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2010/09/100901072908.htm

Global degradation of ecosystems is widely believed to threaten human welfare, yet accepted measures of well-being show that it is on average improving globally, both in poor countries and rich ones. A team of authors writing in the September issue of BioScience dissects explanations for this "environmentalist's paradox." Noting that understanding the paradox is "critical to guiding future management of ecosystem services," Ciara Raudsepp-Hearne and her colleagues confirm that improvements in aggregate well-being are real, despite convincing evidence of ecosystem decline. Three likely reasons they identify -- past increases in food production, technological innovations that decouple people from ecosystems, and time lags before well-being is affected -- provide few grounds for complacency, however. Raudsepp-Hearne and her coauthors accept the findings of the influential Millennium Ecosystem Assessment that the capacity of ecosystems to produce many services for humans is now low. Yet they uncover no fault with the composite Human Development Index, a widely used metric that incorporates measures of literacy, life expectancy, and income, and has improved markedly since the mid-1970s. Although some measures of personal security buck the upward trend, the overall improvement in well-being seems robust. The researchers resolve the paradox partly by pointing to evidence that food production (which has increased globally over past decades) is more important for human well-being than are other ecosystem services. They also establish support for two other explanations: that technology and innovation have **decoupled human well-being from ecosystem degradation**, and that there is a time lag after ecosystem service degradation before human well-being will be affected.

**Won’t collapse the environment – redundancy has negative effects on ecosystems**

The **Washington Post**, August 29, 19**97**, “Diversity Is Not Enough to Ensure Hardy Ecosystems,” p. A03, l/n

Ecologists have long maintained that diversity is one of nature’s greatest strengths, but new research suggests that diversity alone does not guarantee strong ecosystems. In findings that could intensify the national debate over endangered species and habitat conservation, three new studies suggest that a greater abundance of plant and animal varieties does not always translate to better ecological health. At least equally important, the research found, are the types of species and how they function together. “Having a long list of Latin names isn’t always better than a shorter list of Latin names,” said Stanford University biologist Peter Vitousek, co-author of one of the studies published in the journal Science. Separate experiments in California, Minnesota and Sweden found that diversity often had little bearing on the performance of ecosystems -- at least as measured by the growth and health of native plants. In fact, the communities with the greatest biological richness were often the poorest when it came to productivity and the cycling of nutrients. One study compared plant life on 50 remote islands in northern Sweden that are prone to frequent wildfires from lightning strikes. Scientist David Wardle of Landcare Research in Lincoln, New Zealand, and colleagues at the Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences, found that islands dominated by a few species of plants recovered more quickly than nearby islands with greater biological diversity. Similar findings were reported by University of Minnesota researchers who studied savannah grasses, and by Stanford’s Vitousek and colleague David Hooper, who concluded that functional characteristics of plant species were more important than the number of varieties in determining how ecosystems performed. “In aiming to protect natural ecosystems, we cannot just manage for species variety alone,” the Stanford researchers wrote. British plant ecologist J.P. Grime, in a commentary summarizing the research, said there is not yet “convincing evidence that species diversity and ecosystem function are consistently and causally related.” “It could be argued,” he added, “that the tide is turning against the notion of high biodiversity as a controller of ecosystem function and insurance against ecological collapse.”

## Relations

#### A Drilling agreement alone won’t spill-over to broad relations

Padgett ‘12

Tim Padgett joined TIME in 1996 as Mexico City bureau chief covering Latin America. In 1999 he moved to Florida to become TIME’s Miami & Latin America bureau chief, reporting on the hemisphere from Tallahassee to Tierra del Fuego. He has chronicled Mexico’s democratization and drug war as well as the rise of Latin leaders like Lula and Hugo Chavez, TIME, 1-27-2012, “The Oil Off Cuba: Washington and Havana Dance at Arms Length Over Spill Prevention,” http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2105598,00.html#ixzz2NxDjxp81, accessed 5-10-2013

What experts on both sides of the Straits hope is that sea currents will carry any oil slick directly out into the Atlantic Ocean. But that's wishful thinking. So probably is the notion that U.S.-Cuba cooperation on offshore drilling can be duplicated on other fronts. Among them are the embargo, including the arguably unconstitutional ban on U.S. travel to Cuba, which has utterly failed to dislodge the Castro regime but which Washington keeps in place for fear of offending Cuban-American voters in swing-state Florida; and cases like that of Alan Gross, a U.S. aid worker imprisoned in Cuba since 2009 on what many call questionable spying charges.

**China’s engagement in Latin America is key to its economy**

**Farnsworth, 12** – Vice-president of the Council of the Americas in Washington DC (Eric, “Memo to Washington: China's Growing Presence in Latin America,” Americas Quarterly, Vol. 6, No. 1, Winter, 2012, http://www.americasquarterly.org/Farnsworth)//VP

What is China doing in the Americas? It’s a good question—and an increasingly important one for policymakers in Washington. According to one U.S. analyst, it’s about “goodwill, good business and strategic position.”1 Perhaps. But the jury is still out, mostly because China’s interest in the Western Hemisphere is barely a decade old. For many years, beyond attempts to wean Latin American and Caribbean nations away from support for Taiwan and efforts to build Third World solidarity, China’s footprint in the Americas was light. That has now changed. Since then-President Jiang Zemin’s 13-day trip to Latin America in April 2001 and the subsequent visits of President Hu Jintao in 2004 and 2011, Chinese engagement with the region has exploded. Today, China is the top trade partner of Brazil and Chile, and the second trade partner of Argentina and Peru. By late 2010, Chinese enterprises had invested almost $44 billion in the region, according to China’s National Development and Reform Commission, almost a quarter of which was invested in 2010 alone. Top investment targets included Brazil, but also Argentina, Chile, Ecuador, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela. Innovative financing by Chinese entities was often behind the deals—and in some cases, such as Ecuador and Venezuela, investments took the form of loans secured by guaranteed future deliveries of oil. That is a marked change from 2003, the year before Hu’s first visit, when China invested just $1 billion in all of Latin America. By now the outlines of the story are well known. As part of the dash for economic growth that the Chinese Communist Party believes will help to maintain its legitimacy—an average annual rate of 9.8 percent from 1979 to 2009, including an 8.7 percent growth rate in 2009 when much of the rest of the world faced economic collapse—Beijing is on a global quest to lock in the natural resources that fuel its growth. From Southeast Asia to Africa to Latin America and beyond, China is scouring the globe to invest in primary commodities. By the end of 2011, more than $3 trillion in foreign exchange reserves provided an impressive war chest from which to purchase the global assets that China’s leaders believe they need to support economic growth—and thus political stability—for the medium to longer term. As China faces its own near-term leadership transition, efforts to purchase domestic political stability with foreign trade and investment are likely to intensify. At the same time, Latin American nations that have been the primary trade and investment partners with China have also gained handsomely, at least in the short term, in the sectors that produce primary goods. Longer term questions abound regarding the balance and terms of trade, the nature of the investments that China is making, and the values that are being promoted or undermined by such investments.2 Additionally, nations that are not supplying significant amounts of commodities to China, including Mexico and Central America, view China more as an aggressive competitor than as an economic partner. The costs and benefits of trade with China are unequally distributed across the Americas.

**That solves global economic collapse and nuclear lashout**

**Buzan and Foot 04 –** professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science; professor of International Relations at St. Anthony College, (Barry and Rosemary, “Does China Matter? A Reassessment: Essays in Memory of Gerald Segal”, ed., Questia, p. 145-147, USC Libraries)//JK

China, East Asia and the world The underlying argument in this section is that there is a strong link between the global standing of a major power and the way that power relates to the other states in its home region. As a general rule, the status of great power, and more so superpower, requires not only that the state concerned be able and willing to project its political influence beyond its immediate region, but that it also be able in some sense to manage, and perhaps lead, its region (Buzan and Wæver, 2003). The U.S. clearly does this in North America, and more arguably for the Western hemisphere as a whole, and the EU does it in Europe. The Soviet Union did it from 1945 to 1989, and the possible inability of Russia to do it (and its desperation to do so) explain the current question marks around its status. India's failure to do it is a big part of what denies it the great-power recognition it craves. During the Cold War, and up to a point still, Japan could exploit its political geography to detach itself from much of Asian politics, and float free as a kind of economic great power. China does not have that kind of geopolitical option. Like Russia and India, it cannot escape regional politics. China's global standing thus depends crucially on what kind of relationship it has with its neighbours. If China is able to reassert some form of hegemony over twenty-first century Asia - **get**ting most or all of its neighbours to bandwagon with it - then its global standing will be hugely enhanced. But if China inspires fear in its neighbours - causing them to balance against it - then like India, and possibly Russia, it will be locked into its region, and its global standing will be diminished. Since the U.S. is strongly present in Asia, its influence also plays into this equation. Indeed, if China is at odds with its neighbours then its position will be worse than that of Russia and India. In their immediate regions, those two have only to deal with powers much smaller than themselves. In China's region there are several very substantial powers whose antagonism would be a real burden. The importance of regional relations for a major power's global standing is easily shown by two extreme scenarios for China's future. In the first, China's development provides it with the strength and the identity to become the central hub of Asia, in the process largely displacing the U.S.. It projects an acceptable political and economic image, and its neighbours bandwagon with it out of some combination of fear, prudence, admiration and hope for economic advantage. Its economy becomes the regional locomotive, and in political and military terms it is acknowledged as primus inter pares by Japan, Korea and the ASEAN states. Japan takes up a similar subordinate relationship with China to that it now has with the U.S., and China is able to use the regional institutions created by ASEAN rather as the U.S. uses the Organization of American States. If the other Asian states fear to antagonize China, and don't balance against it, then China is both free to play a larger global role, and is insulated against pressure from the West. And if China succeeds in positioning itself at the centre of an Asian economy, then it can claim 'locomotive' status along with the U.S. and the EU in the global economy. In the second scenario, China inspires fear in its neighbours. Japan's alliance with the U.S. deepens, and India, Southeast Asia, Japan and possibly Russia coordinate their defences against China, probably with U.S. support. Under the first set of conditions, China acquires a stable regional base which gives it both the status and the capability to play seriously on the global political stage. Under the second set of conditions, China may still be the biggest power in East Asia, but its ability to play on the global stage would be seriously curtailed. The task for this section is thus to examine the social and material forces in play and ask how they might support or block a move in either of these directions. Is it likely that China will acquire hegemony in East Asia, or is its rise to power more likely to produce U.S.-backed regional balancing against it? I will examine the factors playing into this question on three levels: China's capabilities and the trajectory of its internal development; China's relations with its Asian neighbours; and its relationships with the U.S. and the other great powers. China's capabilities and the trajectory of its internal development Debates about China's capability and prospects for development can be placed within a matrix formed by two variables: • Does China get stronger (because its economic development continues successfully) or weaker (because its development runs into obstacles, or triggers socio-political instability)? • Does China become a malign, aggressive, threatening force in international society (because it becomes hypernationalist or fascist), or does it become more benign and cooperative (because economic development brings internal democratization and liberalization)? If China's development falters and it becomes weak, then it will neither dominate its region nor project itself on to the global stage. Whether it is then politically benign or malign will be a much less pressing issue in terms of how others respond to it in the traditional politico-military security domain. What could happen in this scenario is that a breakdown in the socio-political order, perhaps triggered by economic or environmental troubles, might well trigger large-scale migrations, political fragmentations, or wider economic crises that would pose serious threats to China's neighbours. A major political collapse in China could also pose threats at the global level, via the scenario of a failed nuclear weapon state. But, if China becomes strong, then the malign or benign question matters a great deal. The benign and malign options could be alternative paths, or could occur in sequence, with a malign phase giving way to a benign one, as happened with Germany and Japan during their comparable phases of industrialization. The likelihood of just such a sequence was what underpinned Gerry's concern to promote constrainment.

**China influence solves every impact – collapse causes conflict**

**Zhang ’12** [Prof of Diplomacy and IR at the Geneva School of Diplomacy. “The Rise of China’s Political Softpower” 9/4/12 http://www.china.org.cn/opinion/2012-09/04/content\_26421330.htm ]

As China plays an increasingly significant role in the world, its soft power must be attractive both domestically as well as internationally. The world faces many difficulties, including **widespread poverty**, **international conflict**, **the clash of civilizations** and **environmental protection**. Thus far, the Western model has not been able to decisively address these issues; the China model therefore brings hope that we can make progress in conquering these dilemmas. Poverty and development The Western-dominated global economic order has worsened poverty in developing countries. Per-capita consumption of resources in developed countries is 32 times as large as that in developing countries. Almost half of the population in the world still lives in poverty. Western countries nevertheless still are striving to consolidate their wealth using any and all necessary means. In contrast, China forged a new path of development for its citizens in spite of this unfair international order which enabled it to virtually eliminate extreme poverty at home. This extensive experience would indeed be helpful in the fight against global poverty. War and peace In the past few years, the American model of "exporting democracy'" has **produced a more turbulent world,** as the increased risk of **terrorism threatens global security**. In contrast, China insists that "harmony is most precious". It is more practical, the Chinese system argues, to strengthen international cooperation while addressing both the symptoms and root causes of terrorism. The clash of civilizations Conflict between Western countries and the Islamic world is intensifying. "In a world, which is diversified and where multiple civilizations coexist, the obligation of Western countries is to protect their own benefits yet promote benefits of other nations," wrote Harvard University professor Samuel P. Huntington in his seminal 1993 essay "The Clash of Civilizations?". China strives for "being harmonious yet remaining different", which means to respect other nations, and learn from each other. This philosophy is, in fact, wiser than that of Huntington, and it's also the reason why few religious conflicts have broken out in China. China's stance in regards to reconciling cultural conflicts, therefore, is more preferable than its "self-centered" Western counterargument. Environmental protection Poorer countries and their people are the most obvious victims of global warming, yet they are the least responsible for the **emission of greenhouse gases**. Although Europeans and Americans have a strong awareness of environmental protection, it is still hard to change their extravagant lifestyles. Chinese environmental protection standards are not yet ideal, but some effective environmental ideas can be extracted from the China model. Perfecting the China model The China model is still being perfected, but its unique influence in dealing with the above four issues grows as China becomes stronger. China's experiences in eliminating poverty, prioritizing modernization while maintaining traditional values, and creating core values for its citizens demonstrate our insight and sense of human consciousness. Indeed, the success of the China model has not only brought about China's rise, but also a new trend that can't be explained by Western theory. In essence, the rise of China is the rise of China's political soft power, which has significantly helped China deal with challenges, assist developing countries in reducing poverty, and manage global issues. As the China model improves, it will continue to surprise the world.

**Chinese influence in Latin America quells tensions over Taiwan**

**Ellis ‘11** (R. Evan. Assistant Professor of National Security Studies in the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies at the National Defense University. “Chinese Soft Power in Latin America: A Case Study” Joint Force Quarterly, Vol 60. 2011. http://www.ndu.edu/press/chinese-soft-power-latin-america.html)

Diplomatic Recognition of Taiwan. For the PRC, the government of Taiwan represents an important issue of political legitimacy and internal security. Currently, 12 of the 23 nations in the world that diplomatically recognize the government of Taiwan are found in Latin America and the Caribbean. Although the People's Republic of China does not publicly threaten to block investment in or loans to countries that do not recognize the PRC, China repeatedly emphasizes the issue in its public diplomacy in the region, and makes such investments and market access difficult for those countries that do not recognize it, while simultaneously nurturing expectations regarding the opportunities that diplomatically recognizing the PRC could bring. When Costa Rica changed its diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to the PRC in May 2007, for example, it received an aid package that included an $83 million soccer stadium, the purchase of $300 million in government bonds, various highway, public works, and aid projects, and a $1 billion joint venture to expand the country's petroleum refinery, as well as PRC aid in facilitating access to Chinese markets by traditional Costa Rican products such as coffee. In part, such Chinese generosity was directed toward the other countries in the region that still recognized Taiwan in order to demonstrate the types of benefits that could be made available if they too were to change their diplomatic posture.13 Although the PRC and Taiwan have informally agreed to refrain from the use of economic incentives to competitively "bid" for diplomatic recognition, since Costa Rica's switch, the allure of the PRC has prompted declarations of interest in changing diplomatic posture by Panamanian president Richard Martenelli, Paraguayan president Fernando Lugo, and Salvadoran president Maricio Fuenes—although all did so prior to assuming office.

**One in three billion is the risk of nuclear terror – assumes every warrant**

**Mueller 10** (John, professor of political science at Ohio State, Calming Our Nuclear Jitters, Issues in Science and Technology, Winter, <http://www.issues.org/26.2/mueller.html>)

Politicians of all stripes preach to an anxious, appreciative, and very numerous choir when they, like President Obama, proclaim atomic terrorism to be “the most immediate and extreme threat to global security.” It is the problem that, according to Defense Secretary Robert Gates, currently keeps every senior leader awake at night. This is hardly a new anxiety. In 1946, atomic bomb maker J. Robert Oppenheimer ominously warned that if three or four men could smuggle in units for an atomic bomb, they could blow up New York. This was an early expression of a pattern of dramatic risk inflation that has persisted throughout the nuclear age. In fact, although expanding fires and fallout might increase the effective destructive radius, the blast of a Hiroshima-size device would “blow up” about 1% of the city’s area—a tragedy, of course, but not the same as one 100 times greater. In the early 1970s, nuclear physicist Theodore Taylor proclaimed the atomic terrorist problem to be “immediate,” explaining at length “how comparatively easy it would be to steal nuclear material and step by step make it into a bomb.” At the time he thought it was already too late to “prevent the making of a few bombs, here and there, now and then,” or “in another ten or fifteen years, it will be too late.” Three decades after Taylor, we continue to wait for terrorists to carry out their “easy” task. In contrast to these predictions, terrorist groups seem to have exhibited only limited desire and even less progress in going atomic. This may be because, after brief exploration of the possible routes, they, unlike generations of alarmists, have discovered that the tremendous effort required is scarcely likely to be successful. The most plausible route for terrorists, according to most experts, would be to manufacture an atomic device themselves from purloined fissile material (plutonium or, more likely, highly enriched uranium). This task, however, remains a daunting one, requiring that a considerable series of difficult hurdles be conquered and in sequence. Outright armed theft of fissile material is exceedingly unlikely not only because of the resistance of guards, but because chase would be immediate. A more promising approach would be to corrupt insiders to smuggle out the required substances. However, this requires the terrorists to pay off a host of greedy confederates, including brokers and money-transmitters, any one of whom could turn on them or, either out of guile or incompetence, furnish them with stuff that is useless. Insiders might also consider the possibility that once the heist was accomplished, the terrorists would, as analyst Brian Jenkins none too delicately puts it, “have every incentive to cover their trail, beginning with eliminating their confederates.” If terrorists were somehow successful at obtaining a sufficient mass of relevant material, they would then probably have to transport it a long distance over unfamiliar terrain and probably while being pursued by security forces. Crossing international borders would be facilitated by following established smuggling routes, but these are not as chaotic as they appear and are often under the watch of suspicious and careful criminal regulators. If border personnel became suspicious of the commodity being smuggled, some of them might find it in their interest to disrupt passage, perhaps to collect the bounteous reward money that would probably be offered by alarmed governments once the uranium theft had been discovered. Once outside the country with their precious booty, terrorists would need to set up a large and well-equipped machine shop to manufacture a bomb and then to populate it with a very select team of highly skilled scientists, technicians, machinists, and administrators. The group would have to be assembled and retained for the monumental task while no consequential suspicions were generated among friends, family, and police about their curious and sudden absence from normal pursuits back home. Members of the bomb-building team would also have to be utterly devoted to the cause, of course, and they would have to be willing to put their lives and certainly their careers at high risk, because after their bomb was discovered or exploded they would probably become the targets of an intense worldwide dragnet operation. Some observers have insisted that it would be easy for terrorists to assemble a crude bomb if they could get enough fissile material. But Christoph Wirz and Emmanuel Egger, two senior physicists in charge of nuclear issues at Switzerland‘s Spiez Laboratory, bluntly conclude that the task “could hardly be accomplished by a subnational group.” They point out that precise blueprints are required, not just sketches and general ideas, and that even with a good blueprint the terrorist group would most certainly be forced to redesign. They also stress that the work is difficult, dangerous, and extremely exacting, and that the technical requirements in several fields verge on the unfeasible. Stephen Younger, former director of nuclear weapons research at Los Alamos Laboratories, has made a similar argument, pointing out that uranium is “exceptionally difficult to machine” whereas “plutonium is one of the most complex metals ever discovered, a material whose basic properties are sensitive to exactly how it is processed.“ Stressing the “daunting problems associated with material purity, machining, and a host of other issues,” Younger concludes, “to think that a terrorist group, working in isolation with an unreliable supply of electricity and little access to tools and supplies” could fabricate a bomb “is farfetched at best.” Under the best circumstances, the process of making a bomb could take months or even a year or more, which would, of course, have to be carried out in utter secrecy. In addition, people in the area, including criminals, may observe with increasing curiosity and puzzlement the constant coming and going of technicians unlikely to be locals. If the effort to build a bomb was successful, the finished product, weighing a ton or more, would then have to be transported to and smuggled into the relevant target country where it would have to be received by collaborators who are at once totally dedicated and technically proficient at handling, maintaining, detonating, and perhaps assembling the weapon after it arrives. The financial costs of this extensive and extended operation could easily become monumental. There would be expensive equipment to buy, smuggle, and set up and people to pay or pay off. Some operatives might work for free out of utter dedication to the cause, but the vast conspiracy also requires the subversion of a considerable array of criminals and opportunists, each of whom has every incentive to push the price for cooperation as high as possible. Any criminals competent and capable enough to be effective allies are also likely to be both smart enough to see boundless opportunities for extortion and psychologically equipped by their profession to be willing to exploit them. Those who warn about the likelihood of a terrorist bomb contend that a terrorist group could, if with great difficulty, overcome each obstacle and that doing so in each case is “not impossible.” But although it may not be impossible to surmount each individual step, the likelihood that a group could surmount a series of them quickly becomes vanishingly small. Table 1 attempts to catalogue the barriers that must be overcome under the scenario considered most likely to be successful. In contemplating the task before them, would-be atomic terrorists would effectively be required to go though an exercise that looks much like this. If and when they do, they will undoubtedly conclude that their prospects are daunting and accordingly uninspiring or even terminally dispiriting. It is possible to calculate the chances for success. Adopting probability estimates that purposely and heavily bias the case in the terrorists’ favor—for example, assuming the terrorists have a 50% chance of overcoming each of the 20 obstacles—the chances that a concerted effort would be successful comes out to be less than one in a million. If one assumes, somewhat more realistically, that their chances at each barrier are one in three, the cumulative odds that they will be able to pull off the deed drop to one in well over three billion. Other routes would-be terrorists might take to acquire a bomb are even more problematic. They are unlikely to be given or sold a bomb by a generous like-minded nuclear state for delivery abroad because the risk would be high, even for a country led by extremists, that the bomb (and its source) would be discovered even before delivery or that it would be exploded in a manner and on a target the donor would not approve, including on the donor itself. Another concern would be that the terrorist group might be infiltrated by foreign intelligence. The terrorist group might also seek to steal or illicitly purchase a “loose nuke“ somewhere. However, it seems probable that **none exist**. All governments have an intense interest in controlling any weapons on their territory because of fears that they might become the primary target. Moreover, as technology has developed, finished bombs have been out-fitted with devices that trigger a non-nuclear explosion that destroys the bomb if it is tampered with. And there are other security techniques: Bombs can be kept disassembled with the component parts stored in separate high-security vaults, and a process can be set up in which two people and multiple codes are required not only to use the bomb but to store, maintain, and deploy it. As Younger points out, “only a few people in the world have the knowledge to cause an unauthorized detonation of a nuclear weapon.” There could be dangers in the chaos that would emerge if a nuclear state were to utterly collapse; Pakistan is frequently cited in this context and sometimes North Korea as well. However, even under such conditions, nuclear weapons would probably remain under heavy guard by people who know that a purloined bomb might be used in their own territory. They would still have locks and, in the case of Pakistan, the weapons would be disassembled. The al Qaeda factor The degree to which al Qaeda, the only terrorist group that seems to want to target the United States, has pursued or even has much interest in a nuclear weapon may have been exaggerated. The 9/11 Commission stated that “al Qaeda has tried to acquire or make nuclear weapons for at least ten years,” but the only substantial evidence it supplies comes from an episode that is supposed to have taken place about 1993 in Sudan, when al Qaeda members may have sought to purchase some uranium that turned out to be bogus. Information about this supposed venture apparently comes entirely from Jamal al Fadl, who defected from al Qaeda in 1996 after being caught stealing $110,000 from the organization. Others, including the man who allegedly purchased the uranium, assert that although there were various other scams taking place at the time that may have served as grist for Fadl, the uranium episode never happened. As a key indication of al Qaeda’s desire to obtain atomic weapons, many have focused on a set of conversations in Afghanistan in August 2001 that two Pakistani nuclear scientists reportedly had with Osama bin Laden and three other al Qaeda officials. Pakistani intelligence officers characterize the discussions as “academic” in nature. It seems that the discussion was wide-ranging and rudimentary and that the scientists provided no material or specific plans. Moreover, the scientists probably were incapable of providing truly helpful information because their expertise was not in bomb design but in the processing of fissile material, which is almost certainly beyond the capacities of a nonstate group. Kalid Sheikh Mohammed, the apparent planner of the 9/11 attacks, reportedly says that al Qaeda’s bomb efforts never went beyond searching the Internet. After the fall of the Taliban in 2001, technical experts from the CIA and the Department of Energy examined documents and other information that were uncovered by intelligence agencies and the media in Afghanistan. They uncovered no credible information that al Qaeda had obtained fissile material or acquired a nuclear weapon. Moreover, they found no evidence of any radioactive material suitable for weapons. They did uncover, however, a “nuclear-related” document discussing “openly available concepts about the nuclear fuel cycle and some weapons-related issues.” Just a day or two before al Qaeda was to flee from Afghanistan in 2001, bin Laden supposedly told a Pakistani journalist, “If the United States uses chemical or nuclear weapons against us, we might respond with chemical and nuclear weapons. We possess these weapons as a deterrent.” Given the military pressure that they were then under and taking into account the evidence of the primitive or more probably nonexistent nature of al Qaeda’s nuclear program, the reported assertions, although unsettling, appear at best to be a desperate bluff. Bin Laden has made statements about nuclear weapons a few other times. Some of these pronouncements can be seen to be threatening, but they are rather coy and indirect, indicating perhaps something of an interest, but not acknowledging a capability. And as terrorism specialist Louise Richardson observes, “Statements claiming a right to possess nuclear weapons have been misinterpreted as expressing a determination to use them. This in turn has fed the exaggeration of the threat we face.” Norwegian researcher Anne Stenersen concluded after an exhaustive study of available materials that, although “it is likely that al Qaeda central has considered the option of using non-conventional weapons,” there is “little evidence that such ideas ever developed into actual plans, or that they were given any kind of priority at the expense of more traditional types of terrorist attacks.” She also notes that information on an al Qaeda computer left behind in Afghanistan in 2001 indicates that only $2,000 to $4,000 was earmarked for weapons of mass destruction research and that the money was mainly for very crude work on chemical weapons. Today, the key portions of al Qaeda central may well total only a few hundred people, apparently assisting the Taliban’s distinctly separate, far larger, and very troublesome insurgency in Afghanistan. Beyond this tiny band, there are thousands of sympathizers and would-be jihadists spread around the globe. They mainly connect in Internet chat rooms, engage in radicalizing conversations, and variously dare each other to actually do something. Any “threat,” particularly to the West, appears, then, principally to derive from self-selected people, often isolated from each other, who fantasize about performing dire deeds. From time to time some of these people, or ones closer to al Qaeda central, actually manage to do some harm. And occasionally, they may even be able to pull off something large, such as 9/11. But in most cases, their capacities and schemes, or alleged schemes, seem to be far less dangerous than initial press reports vividly, even hysterically, suggest. Most important for present purposes, however, is that any notion that al Qaeda has the capacity to acquire nuclear weapons, even if it wanted to, looks farfetched in the extreme. It is also noteworthy that, although there have been plenty of terrorist attacks in the world since 2001, all have relied on conventional destructive methods. For the most part, terrorists seem to be heeding the advice found in a memo on an al Qaeda laptop seized in Pakistan in 2004: “Make use of that which is available … rather than waste valuable time becoming despondent over that which is not within your reach.” In fact, history consistently demonstrates that terrorists prefer weapons that they know and understand, not new, exotic ones. Glenn Carle, a 23-year CIA veteran and once its deputy intelligence officer for transnational threats, warns, “We must not take fright at the specter our leaders have exaggerated. In fact, we must see jihadists for the small, lethal, disjointed, and miserable opponents that they are.” al Qaeda, he says, has only a handful of individuals capable of planning, organizing, and leading a terrorist organization, and although the group has threatened attacks with nuclear weapons, “its capabilities are far inferior to its desires.” Policy alternatives The purpose here has not been to argue that policies designed to inconvenience the atomic terrorist are necessarily unneeded or unwise. Rather, in contrast with the many who insist that atomic terrorism under current conditions is rather likely— indeed, exceedingly likely—to come about, I have contended that it is hugely unlikely. However, it is important to consider not only the likelihood that an event will take place, but also its consequences. Therefore, one must be concerned about catastrophic events even if their probability is small, and efforts to reduce that likelihood even further may well be justified. At some point, however, probabilities become so low that, even for catastrophic events, it may make sense to ignore them or at least put them on the back burner; in short, the risk becomes acceptable. For example, the British could at any time attack the United States with their submarine-launched missiles and kill millions of Americans, far more than even the most monumentally gifted and lucky terrorist group. Yet the risk that this potential calamity might take place evokes little concern; essentially it is an acceptable risk. Meanwhile, Russia, with whom the United States has a rather strained relationship, could at any time do vastly more damage with its nuclear weapons, a fully imaginable calamity that is substantially ignored. In constructing what he calls “a case for fear,” Cass Sunstein, a scholar and current Obama administration official, has pointed out that if there is a yearly probability of 1 in 100,000 that terrorists could launch a nuclear or massive biological attack, the risk would cumulate to 1 in 10,000 over 10 years and to 1 in 5,000 over 20. These odds, he suggests, are “not the most comforting.” Comfort, of course, lies in the viscera of those to be comforted, and, as he suggests, many would probably have difficulty settling down with odds like that. But there must be some point at which the concerns even of these people would ease. Just perhaps it is at one of the levels suggested above: one in a million or one in three billion per attempt.

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## Oil DA

#### Shale is collapsing now – no exports and no effect on prices

**Guryanov, 10/2**

Leonid Guryanov, reporter for “The Voice of Russia,”: who focuses in energy news, citing Dmitry Alexandrov, the chief of the analytical research service of the UNIVER Capital Company. “Oil and Gas Companies Lose Interesting in US Shale Gas,”10/2/13, <http://voiceofrussia.com/2013_10_02/Oil-and-gas-companies-lose-interest-in-US-shale-gas-1809/> //BGHS:IS

One of the world’s biggest oil and gas companies, Royal Dutch Shell, is gradually pulling out of its shale gas projects. Royal Dutch Shell said a few days ago it was selling off major shale assets due to its gas production backlog. Early last year, the United States pinned great hopes on shale gas production. President Barack Obama said the new production technologies would ensure the US energy independence for a whole century. The so-called ‘shale gas revolution’ did have a role to play in the US economy. The United States stopped importing natural gas, while boosting shale gas production by a factor of 10. But many major gas producers began to report problems quite soon, namely a large-scale depreciation of shale assets. The British companies BP and BP Group said they’d lost one billion dollars and one billion 300 million dollars respectively, while the Canadian EnCana Company said it had lost almost two billion dollars. Now it is Shell, which says it has written off more than two billion dollars. The company is selling its Eagle Ford Shale stake in South Texas, one of the biggest shale gas deposits in the United States. The company claims that almost 200 gas wells, drilled in the area, are incapable of reaching their planned production capacity. The expert warning that the US shale gas reserves were largely exaggerated, while the deposits were quickly depleted due to the specifics of the production technology was obviously ignored. Now they have more problems, says the chief of the analytical research service of the UNIVER Capital Company, Dmitry Alexandrov. "The surge in the interest in shale gas **is clearly over**. Given the US budget problems, shale gas production companies should expect no more funding. Therefore, shale gas deposits are no longer financially attractive. And finally, the cost-effective subsurface sites have been depleted. So, to go ahead with shale gas production, they have either to resort to a lot of extra drilling, or call into question the existing gas production." Experts believe that after the shale gas peak of 2011, gas production will grow stable at best. But the US will certainly not be able to export its cheap shale gas to Europe or Asia, Dmitry Alexandrov says.

#### Shale is a bust and is not sustainable – ignore media hype

Loder, 10/10

Asjylyn Loder, reporter for BusinessWeek, citing David Hughes, a geoscientist and president of Global Sustainability Research, “U.S. Shale-Oil Boom May Not Last as Fracking Wells Lack Staying Power,” 10/10/13, http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-10-10/u-dot-s-dot-shale-oil-boom-may-not-last-as-fracking-wells-lack-staying-power#p1

Global Sustainability’s Hughes estimates the U.S. needs to drill 6,000 new wells per year at a cost of $35 billion to maintain current production. His research also shows that the newest wells aren’t as productive as those drilled in the first years of the boom, a sign that oil companies have already tapped the best spots, making it that much harder to keep breaking records. Hughes has predicted that production will peak in 2017 and fall to 2012 levels within two years. “The hype about U.S. energy independence and ‘Saudi America’ is deafening if you look at the mainstream media,” Hughes says. “We need to have a much more in-depth and intelligent discussion about this.” On Oct. 7, Abdalla Salem el-Badri, OPEC’s secretary general, said at a conference in Kuwait that U.S. shale producers are “running out of sweet spots” and that output will peak in 2018.

#### China will get involved in a Central Asian conflict

Peimani 02

Hooman Peimani, PhD, is principal fellow at the Energy Studies Institute at the National University of Singapore. His published works include Falling Terrorism and Rising Conflicts: The Afghan "Contribution" to Polarization and Confrontation in West and South Asia. (Author). Failed Transition, Bleak Future? : War and Instability in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Westport, CT, USA: Greenwood Press, 2002. p 120.

<http://site.ebrary.com/lib/michstate/Doc?id=10023330&ppg=132>

The regional powers sharing borders with Central Asia cannot remain indifferent in the event of the outbreak of any major military conflict in their neighboring countries. Many factors will motivate China, Iran, and Russia to intervene and will determine the extent of their intervention. The most important are the intensity of the conflict, its speed of expansion, its predictable impact on each of them, the degree of importance of the affected countries for the regional powers, and the latter’s level of commitment to those countries. Concerned about the expansion of independence movements in its Xinjiang Province, China will have every reason for containing a military conflict along its long borders with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, whether it is in the form of a civil war or an interstate war. Such conflict could expand to China because of the existing ethnic ties. At a minimum, it could further radicalize the Uyghur independence movements. For the same reason, any conflict in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan with the potential to expand to other countries would make China concerned. At the June 2001 Shanghai Cooperation Organisation meeting, the Chinese expressed their fear of the growing independence movement in Xinjiang and of the growth of extremism in Afghanistan, which could destabilize all of Central Asia and the neighboring Chinese province. 57 China’s agreement with the other participants on the necessity of a common policy to fight terrorism and extremism clearly indicated its seriousness about the threat and its willingness to take action should the need arise. Besides, China’s extensive economic relations with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have created an economic stake for the Chinese in the stability of their neighbors.

## Case – Spills

#### Trend is with the Neg – Cuban oil exploration will stay low in the squo.

Pinon ‘13

(Progreso Weekly talked with energy affairs researcher Jorge Piñón, a Cuban-American who left the island during Operation Peter Pan and these many years later continues to talk in first-person-singular when referring to Cuba. Piñón has worked in the oil industry and was president for Latin America of AMOCO Oil Co. At present, he is a researcher for the Center for Energy and Environmental Resources of the University of Texas at Austin. The interview was held at the Meliá Habana Hotel in Cuba. The portion quoted in this card are the portions where Pinon is speaking – ¶ Progreso Weekly – May 7th – http://www.havanatimes.org/?p=92634)

That is the process we have conducted for the past 10 years in Cuba, which includes a study by the U.S. Geological Survey. This study, done for the first time in 2004, estimates that in Cuba’s geological north strip, off shore, from Pinar del Río Province to northern Matanzas province, there are oil reserves.¶ The surveyors raise the possibility that from 4 billion to 6 billion barrels of crude are still to be found. These geological studies are very environmental, but historically they are highly trusted by our industry. That doesn’t mean that they guarantee the amount of oil, but it’s the first step in that stage.¶ We are beyond the stage of studies; now we are in the stage of exploration. Four wells have been exploited by serious international oil companies – each well has cost at least $100 million – so, in other words, it wasn’t a political “game.”¶ So far, the hoped-for results have not materialized; at least, that’s what I’m told by sources I’ve consulted. We still have the rest of the Gulf of Mexico, the deep waters in the rest of the Gulf of Mexico, adjacent to the United States’ exclusive zone. I think that there are possibilities there.¶ In my opinion, in the next three to five years, unfortunately, I don’t see a high probability that Cuba will maintain the level of exploration in deep waters such as we’ve seen in the past two or three years.

#### No drilling in Cuba now

**Cuba Standard, 5/31**

The Cuba Standard, Zarubezhneft abandons offshore drilling in Cuba, for now.” 5/31/13. <http://www.cubastandard.com/2013/05/31/zarubezhneft-abandons-offshore-drilling-in-cuba-for-now-2/>

CUBA STANDARD — More than one month after the owner of a drilling platform said it would pull its rig from Cuba, state oil company Unión CubaPetróleo (Cupet) announced in a terse official note that Russia’s OAO Zarubezhneft postponed further offshore exploration The pullout effectively ends all offshore exploratory drilling in Cuba, for now. The failure by the *Songa Mercur* shallow-water rig to find oil in Block L, off Cayo Santa María in north-central Cuba, comes after four dry holes drilled by a deep-water platform in Cuban waters of the Gulf of Mexico in 2012. The lack of success, after five foreign oil consortia invested hundreds of millions of dollars in Cuba over the past couple of years, is dashing hopes to resurrect the cash-starved Cuban economy with oil.

#### Case-by-case safety exemptions solve without lifting embargo

Hatcher ‘10

Monica Hatcher, Energy Reporter for the Houston Chronicle, “Cuba Drilling Poses Spill Issue: Group Says Trade¶ Embargo Could Hinder a Response by the U.S.”, Houston Chronicle; Sept. 6, 2010 – internally quoting Jorge Piñon, a visiting research fellow at the Cuban Research Institute of Florida International University – www.chron.com/business/energy/article/Group-warns-Cuba-trade-embargo-could-hurt-a-spill-1695883.php

Some who support the decades-old embargo are suspicious of the sudden push to tweak the trade sanctions and suspect U.S. oil companies are trying to back their way into Cuba's potentially lucrative oil reserves.¶ "I can't see these companies getting excited over half a dozen wells that are going to be drilled off the coast of Cuba when there are thousands of wells off the coast of Louisiana and Mississippi. Why all of a sudden are they worried about this?" asked Jaime Suchlicki, director of the Institute for Cuban and Cuban American Studies at the University of Miami.¶ He said the government already can issue licenses at its discretion in the event of an emergency and that the industry is pushing to ease the embargo by playing on public fears after the BP Gulf spill.

#### Coast guard already has contingency plans for a Cuban spill

McClatchy ‘11

McClatchy Newspapers, 2-4-2011, “Coast Guard preparing for Cuba oil spills,” http://www.theolympian.com/2010/09/30/1531424/coast-guard-preparing-for-cuba.html

The new U.S. Coast Guard commander for the southeastern United States said Thursday that his agency is looking "very seriously'' at Cuba's plans to drill for oil and reviewing contingency plans in the event of a spill that could reach the Florida coast. "We are actively looking at all the different implications and scenarios to make sure our plans are revised and up to date,'' Rear Adm. William D. Baumgartner told editors at the Miami Herald. He said other agencies also are reviewing their plans. The Spanish oil giant Repsol has leased several undersea blocks from the Cuban government and is expected to begin drilling next year with a rig, the Scarabeo 9, that is being built in China in part to avoid conflicts with the U.S. trade embargo on Cuba. The first block Repsol is expected to explore lies under 5,600 feet of water — 600 feet deeper than the water where BP's Deepwater Horizon well exploded in April — and about 55 miles south of Florida's Marquesas Key. Baumgartner acknowledged that the United States has no emergency response agreement with Cuba for oil spills. The U.S. signed such an agreement with Mexico in 1980. "We have longstanding agreements with Mexico about how we would manage incidents and the . . . plan is routinely monitored,'' Baumgartner said. "There is not a bilateral U.S.-Cuba agreement on oil spills right now.'' While some oil industry analysts worry that Cuba would be ill prepared for an oil spill, Baumgartner noted that Repsol would be responsible for cleaning up any spill that entered U.S. waters and that the Coast Guard would manage any cleanup in U.S. waters. "There are international agreements that discuss the notification and information sharing that has to happen between countries,'' he said.

## Case – Relations

#### Plan insufficient to solve US-Cuba ties

Bert and Clayton ‘12

Melissa Bert, Military Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, Chief of the Maritime and International Law Division at the U.S. Coast Guard, former Adjunct Professor at George Washington University and Florida International University, holds a Command and Staff degree in strategic studies from the Naval War College and degrees from the Coast Guard Academy and the George Washington University Law School, graduate of the Coast Guard Academy and George Washington University Law, and Blake Clayton, Fellow for Energy and National Security at the Council on Foreign Relations, former lecturer in finance and economics at the Oxford University Programme for Undergraduate Studies and researcher at the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, holds a doctorate in business economics and strategy from Oxford University, 2012 (“Addressing the Risk of a Cuban Oil Spill,” Brookings Institution Policy Innovation Memorandum No. 15, March 7th, Available Online at <http://www.cfr.org/cuba/addressing-risk-cuban-oil-spill/p27515>

Efforts to rewrite current law and policy toward Cuba, and encouraging cooperation with its government, could antagonize groups opposed to improved relations with the Castro regime. They might protest any decision allowing U.S. federal agencies to assist Cuba or letting U.S. companies operate in Cuban territory.¶ However, taking sensible steps to prepare for a potential accident at an oil well in Cuban waters would not break new ground or materially alter broader U.S. policy toward Cuba. For years, Washington has worked with Havana on issues of mutual concern. The United States routinely coordinates with Cuba on search and rescue operations in the Straits of Florida as well as to combat illicit drug trafficking and migrant smuggling. During the hurricane season, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) provides Cuba with information on Caribbean storms.¶ The recommendations proposed here are narrowly tailored to the specific challenges that a Cuban oil spill poses to the United States. They would not help the Cuban economy or military. What they would do is protect U.S. territory and property from a potential danger emanating from Cuba.¶ Cuba will drill for oil in its territorial waters with or without the blessing of the United States. Defending against a potential oil spill requires a modicum of advance coordination and preparation with the Cuban government, which need not go beyond spill-related matters. Without taking these precautions, the United States risks a second Deepwater Horizon, this time from Cuba.

#### Removing one sanction not enough to restore relations

Hanson & Lee ’13

Stephanie & Brianna are Senior Production Editors at CFR, “U.S. Cuba Relations,” <http://www.cfr.org/cuba/us-cuba-relations/p11113> kk January 31st

Given the range of issues dividing the two countries, experts say a long process would precede resumption of diplomatic relations. Daniel P. Erikson of the Inter-American Dialogue says that though "you could have the resumption of bilateral talks on issues related to counternarcotics or immigration, or a period of détente, **you are probably not going to see the full restoration of diplomatic relations" in the near term**.¶ **Many** recent policy **reports have recommended** that **the U**nited **S**tates **take some unilateral steps to roll back sanctions on Cuba**. **The removal of sanctions, however, would be just one step in the process** of normalizing relations. Such a process is sure to be controversial, as indicated by the heated congressional debate spurred in March 2009 by attempts to ease travel and trade restrictions in a large appropriations bill. "Whatever we call it--normalization, détente, rapproachement--it is clear that the policy process risks falling victim to the politics of the issue," says Sweig.

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## Case – Spills

**No impact to biodiversity**

**Sagoff 97**  Mark, Senior Research Scholar – Institute for Philosophy and Public policy in School of Public Affairs – U. Maryland, William and Mary Law Review, “INSTITUTE OF BILL OF RIGHTS LAW SYMPOSIUM DEFINING TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE FUTURE OF GOVERNMENT REGULATION: MUDDLE OR MUDDLE THROUGH? TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE MEETS THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT”, 38 Wm and Mary L. Rev. 825, March, L/N

Note – Colin Tudge - Research Fellow at the Centre for Philosophy at the London School of Economics. Frmr Zoological Society of London: Scientific Fellow and tons of other positions. PhD. Read zoology at Cambridge.

Simon Levin = Moffet Professor of Biology, Princeton. 2007 American Institute of Biological Sciences Distinguished Scientist Award 2008 Istituto Veneto di Scienze Lettere ed Arti 2009 Honorary Doctorate of Science, Michigan State University 2010 Eminent Ecologist Award, Ecological Society of America 2010 Margalef Prize in Ecology, etc… PhD

Although one may agree with ecologists such as Ehrlich and Raven that the earth stands on **the brink of** an episode of **massive extinction, it may not follow** from this grim fact **that human** being**s will suffer** as a result. On the contrary, skeptics such as science writer Colin Tudge have challenged biologists to explain **why we need more than a tenth of the 10 to 100 million species that grace the earth**. Noting that "cultivated systems often out-produce wild systems by 100-fold or more," Tudge declared that "the argument that humans need the variety of other species is, when you think about it, a theological one." n343 Tudge observed that "the **elimination of all but a tiny minority** **of our fellow creatures does not affect the material well-being of humans one iota."**n344 This skeptic challenged ecologists to list more than 10,000 species (other than unthreatened microbes) that are essential to ecosystem productivity or functioning. n345 "**The human species could survive just as well if 99.9% of our fellow creatures went extinct,** provided only that we retained the appropriate 0.1% that we need." n346   [\*906]   The monumental Global Biodiversity Assessment ("the Assessment") identified two positions with respect to redundancy of species. "At one extreme is the idea that each species is unique and important, such that its removal or loss will have demonstrable consequences to the functioning of the community or ecosystem." n347 The authors of the Assessment, a panel of eminent ecologists, endorsed this position, saying it is "unlikely that there is much, if any, ecological redundancy in communities over time scales of decades to centuries, the time period over which environmental policy should operate." n348 These eminent ecologists rejected the opposing view, "the notion that species overlap in function to a sufficient degree that removal or loss of a species will be compensated by others, with negligible overall consequences to the community or ecosystem." n349  Other biologists believe, however, that species are so fabulously redundant in the ecological functions they perform that the life-support systems and processes of the planet and ecological processes in general will function perfectly well with fewer of them, certainly fewer than the millions and millions we can expect to remain **even if** **every threatened organism becomes extinct**. n350 Even the kind of sparse and miserable world depicted in the movie Blade Runner could provide a "sustainable" context for the human economy as long as people forgot their aesthetic and moral commitment to the glory and beauty of the natural world. n351 The Assessment makes this point. "Although any ecosystem contains hundreds to thousands of species interacting among themselves and their physical environment, the emerging consensus is that the system is driven by a small number of . . . biotic variables on whose interactions the balance of species are, in a sense, carried along." n352   [\*907]   To make up your mind on the question of the functional redundancy of species, consider an endangered species of bird, plant, or insect and ask how the ecosystem would fare in its absence. The fact that the creature is endangered suggests an answer: it is already in limbo as far as ecosystem processes are concerned. What crucial ecological services does the black-capped vireo, for example, serve? Are any of the species threatened with extinction necessary to the provision of any ecosystem service on which humans depend? If so, which ones are they?  Ecosystems and the species that compose them have changed, dramatically, continually, and totally in virtually every part of the United States. There is little ecological similarity, for example, between New England today and the land where the Pilgrims died. n353 In view of the constant reconfiguration of the biota, **one may wonder why Americans have not suffered more as a result of ecological catastrophes**. The cast of species in nearly every environment changes constantly-local extinction is commonplace in nature-but the crops still grow. Somehow, it seems, property values keep going up on Martha's Vineyard in spite of the tragic disappearance of the heath hen.  One might argue that the sheer number and variety of creatures available to any ecosystem buffers that system against stress. Accordingly, we should be concerned if the "library" of creatures ready, willing, and able to colonize ecosystems gets too small. (Advances in genetic engineering may well permit us to write a large number of additions to that "library.") In the United States as in many other parts of the world, however, **the number of species has been increasing dramatically**, not decreasing, as a result of human activity. This is because the hordes of exotic species coming into ecosystems in the United States far exceed the number of species that are becoming extinct. Indeed, introductions may outnumber extinctions by more than ten to one, so that the United States is becoming more and more species-rich all the time largely as a result of human action. n354 [\*908] Peter Vitousek and colleagues estimate that over 1000 non-native plants grow in California alone; in Hawaii there are 861; in Florida, 1210. n355 In Florida more than 1000 non-native insects, 23 species of mammals, and about 11 exotic birds have established themselves. n356 Anyone who waters a lawn or hoes a garden knows how many weeds desire to grow there, how many birds and bugs visit the yard, and how many fungi, creepy-crawlies, and other odd life forms show forth when it rains. All belong to nature, from wherever they might hail, but not many homeowners would claim that there are too few of them. Now, not all exotic species provide ecosystem services; indeed, some may be disruptive or have no instrumental value. n357 This also may be true, of course, of native species as well, especially because all exotics are native somewhere. Certain exotic species, however, such as Kentucky blue grass, establish an area's sense of identity and place; others, such as the green crabs showing up around Martha's Vineyard, are nuisances. n358 Consider an analogy [\*909] with human migration. Everyone knows that after a generation or two, immigrants to this country are hard to distinguish from everyone else. The vast majority of Americans did not evolve here, as it were, from hominids; most of us "came over" at one time or another. This is true of many of our fellow species as well, and they may fit in here just as well as we do. It is possible to distinguish exotic species from native ones for a period of time, just as we can distinguish immigrants from native-born Americans, but as the centuries roll by, species, like people, fit into the landscape or the society, changing and often enriching it. Shall we have a rule that a species had to come over on the Mayflower, as so many did, to count as "truly" American? Plainly not. When, then, is the cutoff date? Insofar as we are concerned with the absolute numbers of "rivets" holding ecosystems together, extinction seems not to pose a general problem because a far greater number of kinds of mammals, insects, fish, plants, and other creatures thrive on land and in water in America today than in prelapsarian times. n359 The Ecological Society of America has urged managers to maintain biological diversity as a critical component in strengthening ecosystems against disturbance. n360 Yet as Simon Levin observed, "much of the detail about species composition will be irrelevant in terms of influences on ecosystem properties." n361 [\*910] He added: "For net primary productivity, as is likely to be the case for any system property, **biodiversity matters only up to a point**; above a certain level, increasing biodiversity is likely to make **little difference**." n362 What about the use of plants and animals in agriculture? There is no scarcity foreseeable. "Of an estimated 80,000 types of plants [we] know to be edible," a U.S. Department of the Interior document says, "only about 150 are extensively cultivated." n363 About twenty species, not one of which is endangered, provide ninety percent of the food the world takes from plants. n364 Any new food has to take "shelf space" or "market share" from one that is now produced. Corporations also find it difficult to create demand for a new product; for example, people are not inclined to eat paw-paws, even though they are delicious. It is hard enough to get people to eat their broccoli and lima beans. It is harder still to develop consumer demand for new foods. This may be the reason the Kraft Corporation does not prospect in remote places for rare and unusual plants and animals to add to the world's diet. Of the roughly 235,000 flowering plants and 325,000 nonflowering plants (including mosses, lichens, and seaweeds) available, farmers ignore virtually all of them in favor of a very few that are profitable. n365 To be sure, any of the more than 600,000 species of plants could have an application in agriculture, but would they be preferable to the species that are now dominant? Has anyone found any consumer demand for any of these half-million or more plants to replace rice or wheat in the human diet? There are reasons that farmers cultivate rice, wheat, and corn rather than, say, Furbish's lousewort. There are many kinds of louseworts, so named because these weeds were thought to cause lice in sheep. How many does agriculture really require? [\*911] The species on which agriculture relies are domesticated, not naturally occurring; they are developed by artificial not natural selection; they might not be able to survive in the wild. n366 This argument is not intended to deny the religious, aesthetic, cultural, and moral reasons that command us to respect and protect the natural world. These spiritual and ethical values should evoke action, of course, but we should also recognize that they are spiritual and ethical values. We should recognize that ecosystems and all that dwell therein compel our moral respect, our aesthetic appreciation, and our spiritual veneration; we should clearly seek to achieve the goals of the ESA. There is no reason to assume, however, that these goals have anything to do with human well-being or welfare as economists understand that term. These are ethical goals, in other words, not economic ones. Protecting the marsh may be the right thing to do for moral, cultural, and spiritual reasons. We should do it-but someone will have to pay the costs. In the narrow sense of promoting human welfare, protecting nature often represents a net "cost," not a net "benefit." It is largely for moral, not economic, reasons-ethical, not prudential, reasons- that we care about all our fellow creatures. They are valuable as objects of love not as objects of use. What is good for   [\*912]  the marsh may be good in itself even if it is not, in the economic sense, good for mankind. **The most valuable things are quite useless**.

## Case – Relations (China SOI)

#### Chinese growth is key to solve global environmental problems

**Gerth 11** – Karl Gerth is a fellow at Merton College and teaches modern Chinese history at Oxford University, (“Can China Save the World, Twice”, January 1, 2011, http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2011/01/01/chinas-environmental-problems-and-economic-growth.html)//sawyer

\*Renminbi is the currency of the PRC

\*PRC is the People’s Republic of China

\*the People’s Republic of China is a sovereign state in East Asia

With the global economy stalled, all eyes are on Chinese consumers, who professor Karl Gerth says are needed to jump-start growth worldwide—and **maybe also solve the environmental crisis**, too. World business and political leaders are making **major efforts to get China to save the global economy**. From international trade organizations such as the World Bank to politicians including President Obama as well as China’s own rulers—all are pushing China to succeed the U.S. and Western Europe as the next nation of **consumers who will drive world economic growth**. Since the 2008 financial crisis, the international pressure for China to rescue the global economy has only intensified and is certain to continue this year. There has been serious pressure for another round of efforts to persuade China to re-evaluate its currency**, the renminbi, which Washington hopes will effectively give Chinese consumers more money to buy imports.** But as the spending power of Chinese consumers grows, so do China’s environmental problems. China has 16 of the world’s most polluted cities, its lakes and rivers are disappearing, and although it is the world’s largest energy user and carbon-emitter, but it’s still only the 18th per capita emitter.In other words, as Chinese consumers save the world’s economy, China’s environmental problems may get worse, much worse. Take water, the ultimate consumer product. In addition to consuming potable water by cup or bottle, the Chinese, like their counterparts worldwide, consume water indirectly as a critical ingredient in their new and more water-intensive diets based on meat. It takes approximately 1,000 tons of water to produce a single ton of grain and 7 tons of grain to produce a ton of beef. An upshot, then, of China’s switching from their pre-1978 bean-protein-based diets to Kung Pao chicken or McDonald’s hamburgers is that it uses much more water. Many Chinese industries also use massive amounts of water. It takes, for instance, 400,000 liters (or 105,000 gallons) of water to manufacture a single car. And last year, for the first time, Chinese consumers surpassed their American counterparts by buying the most cars**. Any hope for environmental progress will depend on the Chinese managing, against the odds, to excel as stewards of the environment with as much enthusiasm as they have learned to become first-rate consumers.** The market responses to China’s water crisis have created additional environmental problems. Gone are the days when visitors to China struggled to find a store that could sell them something to drink. Now water vendors are everywhere, and the waste bins alongside roads are brimming over with discarded plastic bottles. Even more than in Western countries, fewer and fewer consumers appear to trust tap water, or “Tap-ian,” to coin a pun on Evian, the French water brand that has became a fashion statement for the brand-conscious wealthy in China. The habit of buying bottled water is spreading worldwide, with Americans still leading the way, consuming 8.7 billion gallons of bottled water in 2008, almost double what they drank at the start of the decade. But while the U.S. market for bottled water began to actually decline in 2008, China consumed over 5.2 billion gallons that year and is now by far the fastest growing market. This is only likely to grow, as China drinks only about half the global average of 7.9 gallons of bottled water per person, significantly behind the U.S. (28.5) and the world leader, Mexico (59.1).But as always with China, per-capita matters: If Chinese consumers begin to drink even one-fourth the per capita rate of bottled water as the average American, China will become the world’s largest consumer. But might we also look to China to save the world environmentally? **An environmental protection movement there shows signs of life. The national government has begun to ban certain types of disposable items, and hundreds of small companies in China now manufacture more sustainable alternatives, including biodegradable disposable articles such as chopsticks made from yam starch and tableware made from rice husks, starch, and cardboard**. Most importantly, China now has thousands of local and national environmental non-governmental organizations, most established in the last few years. Organizations like Friends of Nature work tirelessly to protect and restore China’s environment and raise public awareness. But just as China is emulating Western consumer lifestyles, if the history of environmental NGOs in the West offers clues to China’s future, **there is ample reason to worry that Chinese environmentalism is likely to be absorbed by consumer culture, creating new markets for ecotourism, sustainable housing, and consumer products sold as “green.”** And China is less likely to fundamentally challenge a way of life that remains deeply dependent on ecologically destructive and non-renewable resources. It’s not hard to imagine a day in the near future when Chinese tourists heading for weekend vacations in Paris will have the option to buy carbon offsets. Like Western nations before them, the more likely expectation is that the Chinese will drag their feet, make token changes, and outsource their industrial pollution to the “next Chinas” in Vietnam, Zambia, Indonesia, and places with weaker labor laws and environmental protections. Or perhaps they’ll follow the European lead with a “cap and trade” market that mostly shuffles the problem around. Yet although it’s easy to be pessimistic, the scale and relative suddenness of China’s environmental problems linked to that country’s changing consumer habits may also make it easy to imagine how the world’s consciousness—reflected in consumer behavior—needs to change. A large part of any hope for environmental progress will depend on the Chinese managing, against the odds, to excel as stewards of the environment with as much enthusiasm as they have learned to become first-rate consumers. Certainly, there is evidence that China understands the odds and the consequences. We read in the newspapers nearly daily how China is leading the world in renewable energy, as it must if it is to continue its economic growth. The latest: It’s building six gigantic wind farms that will generate the equivalent of 100 coal-fired power plants worth of electricity. China is to be commended for its green efforts. But whether this commitment to renewable energy will be able to catch up with the speed and size of its emerging consumer demand is still an open question. No other nation in the developed world has yet found a way to reverse the ecologically destructive effects of its way of life faster than any off-setting commitment to correcting, let alone reversing them. So this is yet another way in which we can only hope that **China will lead the way with consumers who save the world economically without destroying its environment.**

**Latin America is key to Chinese economic growth**

- Latin America is uniquely key to China’s export market and they have invested their economy in Latin America because of US lack of engagement-new contracts and investment is key to sustain growth

**Arnson et al. ‘9** (Cynthia Anderson, Mark Mohr, Riordan Roett, writers for Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, “Enter the Dragon? China’s Presence in Latin America”, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/EnterDragonFinal.pdf)//RJ

To China, Latin America represents a signiﬁcant source of the necessary natural resources that will **help China maintain its economic growth**. Due primarily to trade with China, Latin America’s trade volume grew from $2.8 billion in 1988 to $49 billion in 2005. Also, and as publicly announced, China intends to surpass $180 billion in trade with Latin America by 2010, not only due to the country’s need for natural resources, but also as a result of China’s intention to diversify and expand its markets in the region. Thus, Latin America represents a substantial market for Chinese goods

**Latin America key to Chinese economy – it’s dependent on export growth – China is also key to Latin American growth**

**Jenkins, 13** - Professor of development economics with an particular interest in Latin America, 13 (Rhys, “Latin America and China- A New Dependency?,” 6/11, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01436597.2012.691834#.UbphhvlQFsk)//VP

Nevertheless, the trend over the past decade has been for the USA’s share in both Latin American imports and exports to decline while that of the EU has remained roughly constant and China’s has increased signiﬁcantly. The Economic Commission for Latin America has projected, based on data for 16 Latin American countries, that, by 2020, China will have overtaken the EU as both an export destination and as a source of imports for the region, and will have narrowed the gap with the USA. In 2020 it is projected that China will account for almost a ﬁfth of Latin American exports and a sixth of imports. In terms of FDI China’s role in the region continues to be marginal. Despite the signiﬁcant recent growth of Chinese investment, in 2010 China accounted for less than 0.3% of the total stock of foreign capital in the region and its share of FDI inﬂows in that year was only 0.8%.47 Even though the oﬃcial ﬁgures may underestimate the true extent of Chinese FDI and a number of major new investments were made in 2010, the role of Chinese ﬁrms in the region remains very limited. As they continue to expand globally, their presence in Latin America is likely to become more signiﬁcant in the future. Nevertheless Chinese FDI is starting from such a low base that it will be some time before it achieves levels comparable to that of US or EU FDI in the region. The global ﬁnancial crisis provides a good test of the extent to which China has emerged as a key driver of economic growth in Latin America, making the region less vulnerable to ﬂuctuations in the US economy. The crisis had a major impact on Latin American exports in 2009, with a decline in value of 23% compared to 2008.48 Exports to the USA fell by 26% and to the European Union by 28%. In stark contrast **Latin American exports to China continued to increase in 2009, by 7.5%, reﬂecting the continued growth of the Chinese economy through the crisis** (see Table 10). This has led ECLAC to claim that ‘China’s economic dynamism has come to the rescue of Latin America and the Caribbean’s exports’.

**Chinese soft power is key to maintain relations with Taiwan stopping risks of escalatory conflict**

**Efthymiou 12** – Pavlos, PhD Candidate in Politics and International Studies, St. Edmund ’ s College, University of Cambridge, (“'Where Does China's Soft Power Stem From and What are its Implications for the US?”, December 21, 2012, http://academia.edu/2319797/Chinese\_Soft\_Power\_Sources\_And\_Implications\_For\_The\_US)//sawyer

Weiji, the Chinese word which describes the combination of threat and opportunity, best describes the way China is perceived in its near abroad. Take Taiwan for instance. Taiwan has the greatest justification to feel ‘threatened’ by China’s rise; and it does. Nonetheless, concurrently, the rise of China has presented Taiwan with immense opportunities. **China is Taiwan’s largest trading partner and Taiwan one of China’s biggest investors. Economic ties have flourished over the last years** (Halper, 2010:18). Now over a million Taiwanese live and work in the mainland, while more and more Taiwanese set up businesses and invest in China (ibid.).**Chinese soft power and the concepts that underlie/frame it, have been central for improving relations with Taiwan.** The Chinese guarantee of non-forceful unification with Taiwan is enhanced strongly by the ‘peaceful rise’ policy, as well as the ‘good neighbourliness’ concept, epitomized by the saying: ‘A far away relative is less helpful than one living nearby’ (Ramo, 2004:52) .**Improvement of Taipei’s relations with the mainland is good news for the US, the main protector of Taiwan. It reduces the risk of crisis and escalation, while continuous multi-level bonding** in the social and economic sphere coupled with confidence-building exercises has produced solid outcomes as the election of the Kuomintang Party (2008) (Halper, 2010:19)

**Chinese economic growth solves**

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Relations within the Asia-Pacific region grew tense during 2012, marked by a number of incidents. The escalation of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute between China, Taiwan, and Japan provoked a wave of demonstrations across China. Territorial rows in the South China Sea shook the ASEAN-China relationship, with no progress made on the “Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea”. Tensions arose outside of bilateral relations with China, as seen in the disunity of ASEAN’s July and November meetings. The magnitude and latitude of these and other incidents have prompted concern about the long-term significance of rising tensions to the region. This discord has developed at a time of great economic success for the Asia-Pacific. According to the World Bank, the Asia-Pacific is the world’s most dynamic economic region, contributing almost 40% of global growth in 2012. Based on current trends, the International Monetary Fund estimates that the Asia-Pacific economy will be larger than that of the United States and European Union by 2030. Amidst this economic dynamism, however, a tense security environment has emerged. The Asia-Pacific is home to five of the eight states recognized as being in possession of nuclear weapons, three of the world’s top six defense budgets, and six of the world’s largest militaries. As stated in Joseph Nye’s East Asian Security: The Case for Deep Engagement, “Politics and economics are connected. International economic systems rest upon international order.” Per their insecure actions, states in the Asia-Pacific appear to be asking themselves whether there will be a security framework that can sustain the Asia-Pacific’s impressive economic growth. Unless the region’s shifting political order is stabilized, the Asia-Pacific risks heightened long-term tensions of strategic and economic significance. A large body of literature would suggest that the Asia-Pacific’s recent economic successes should pave the way for long-term cooperation by linking trade to regional peace. The recognition of mutual benefits from trade theoretically fosters peace as national interests converge, deterring states from initiating conflict against a trading partner for fear of losing trade-associated welfare gains. According to WTO Director-General Pascal Lamy, the Asia-Pacific has become the world’s most integrated trading region. This growth in trade interdependence can be seen amidst now-tense relations between the aforementioned examples. In 2011, China-Japan trade rose 14.3% to $344.9 billion, ASEAN-China trade rose 24% to $362.3 billion, and intra-ASEAN trade rose 15.1% to $598.2 billion. Why then, while contributing 40% of the world’s growth and reaching peak economic integration, should the Asia-Pacific see a rise in behavior contrary to mutually beneficial economic interests? The geopolitical structure of the Asia-Pacific is changing in ways that could have serious consequences for long-run stability, with the rise and fall of Pacific powers promoting insecurity. History demonstrates that periods of the rise and fall of great powers are times of instability in the international system, from Athens’ rise and Sparta’s corresponding fear leading to the Peloponnesian War to the insecurity provoked by Germany’s rise serving as an underlying cause of World War I. While the peace and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific has long relied on American power, America’s preponderance and will to underwrite the international order has been called into question. China has begun a successful ascent to great-power status that, if uninterrupted, will alter the ranking of the world’s major powers. India, Indonesia, and Vietnam are growing rapidly while Japan and South Korea seek larger regional and global roles. While 2012’s tensions may have been augmented by more momentary variables (e.g. changes of government in China, Korea, and Japan), the shifting security environment’s long-term impact on relations is supported by the trend of increasing coercive capabilities in the Asia-Pacific. The NIDS China Security Report 2011 states that China’s annual defense spending increased from $30 billion in 2000 to almost $120 billion in 2010. While Japan has thus far maintained the pretense of keeping defense expenditure within 1% of GDP, this percentage excludes the cost of the Japanese Coast Guard and increased procurement of military equipment on deferred payment. Japan’s recent elections have demonstrated strong support for collective self-defense and amending Japan’s war-renouncing constitution, and the LDP defense task force announced on January 8th that it would increase the nation’s defense budget by more than $1.15 billion. According to IHS Jane’s, South East Asian countries together increased defense spending by 13.5% in 2011 to $24.5 billion. This figure is projected to rise to $40 billion by 2016. The impact of this changing strategic environment can be seen beyond Asia-Pacific states through the United States’ recent “pivot” or “rebalancing”; while under budgetary pressure, the U.S. is crafting a more assertive strategy and is re-posturing naval forces from today’s roughly 50/50% split between the Pacific and the Atlantic to about a 60/40% split favoring Pacific presence. Ultimately, the instability of the Asia-Pacific’s changing geopolitical environment puts the region at risk for long-term heightened tensions, with coercive potential increasing in spite of peak economic growth and interdependence. This strategic concern will have economic repercussions if future tensions play out like the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute, with JPMorgan Chase contributing a 0.8 percentage-point hit to Japan’s GDP in the fourth quarter to 2012’s discord. Maintaining stability is not a lost cause, and tensions must not equal war. However, the changing geopolitical environment must be addressed productively to prevent the continuation of counter-productive tensions and increased risk. Asia-Pacific states can minimize long-term risk beginning with the prioritization of grand strategy over ad-hoc responses. Recognition of the importance of the economic “end” and the effectiveness of a security enhancing “way” that combines the “means” of engagement with coercion provide a good start to limiting an Asia-Pacific regional security dilemma with lasting strategic and economic repercussions.

**No scenario for nuclear terror---consensus of experts**

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For over a decade now, one of the most oft-repeated threats raised by policymakers—the one that in many ways justified the invasion of Iraq—has been that of nuclear terrorism. Officials in both the Bush and Obama administrations, including the presidents themselves, have raised the specter of the atomic terrorist. But **beyond mere rhetoric, how likely is a nuclear terrorist attack** really?¶ While pessimistic estimates about America’s ability to avoid a nuclear terrorist attack became something of a cottage industry following the September 11th attacks, a number of scholars in recent years have pushed back against this trend. Frank Gavin has put post-9/11 fears of nuclear terrorism into historical context (pdf) and **argued against the prevailing alarmism**. Anne Stenersen of the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment has challenged the idea that al Qaeda was ever bound and determined to acquire a nuclear weapon. John **Mueller ridiculed the notion of nuclear terrorism** in his book Atomic Obsessions and highlighted the numerous steps a terrorist group would need to take—all of which would have to be successful—in order to procure, deliver, and detonate an atomic weapon. And in his excellent, and exceedingly even-handed, treatment of the subject, On Nuclear Terrorism, Michael Levi outlined the difficulties terrorists would face building their own nuclear weapon and discussed how a “system of systems” could be developed to interdict potential materials smuggled into the United States—citing a “Murphy’s law of nuclear terrorism” that could possibly dissuade terrorists from even trying in the first place.¶ But what about the possibility that a rogue state could transfer a nuclear weapon to a terrorist group? That was ostensibly why the United States deposed Saddam Hussein’s regime: fear he would turnover one of his hypothetical nuclear weapons for al Qaeda to use.¶ Enter into this discussion Keir Lieber and Daryl Press and their article in the most recent edition of International Security, “Why States Won’t Give Nuclear Weapons to Terrorists.” Lieber and Press have been writing on nuclear issues for just shy of a decade—doing innovative, if controversial work on American nuclear strategy. However, I believe this is their first venture into the debate over nuclear terrorism. And while others, such as Mueller, have argued that states are unlikely to transfer nuclear weapons to terrorists, this article is the first to tackle the subject with an empirical analysis.¶ The title of their article nicely sums up their argument: **states will not turn over nuclear weapons terrorists**. To back up this claim, Lieber and Press attack the idea that states will transfer nuclear weapons to terrorists because terrorists operate of absent a “return address.” Based on an examination of attribution following conventional terrorist attacks, the authors conclude:¶ [N]either a terror group nor a state sponsor would remain anonymous after a nuclear attack. We draw this conclusion on the basis of four main findings. First, data on a decade of terrorist incidents reveal a strong positive relationship between the number of fatalities caused in a terror attack and the likelihood of attribution. Roughly three-quarters of the attacks that kill 100 people or more are traced back to the perpetrators. Second, attribution rates are far higher for attacks on the U.S. homeland or the territory of a major U.S. ally—97 percent (thirty-six of thirty-seven) for incidents that killed ten or more people. Third, tracing culpability from a guilty terrorist group back to its state sponsor is not likely to be difficult: few countries sponsor terrorism; few terrorist groups have state sponsors; each sponsor terrorist group has few sponsors (typically one); and only one country that sponsors terrorism, has nuclear weapons or enough fissile material to manufacture a weapon. In sum, attribution of nuclear terror incidents would be easier than is typically suggested, and passing weapons to terrorists would not offer countries escape from the constraints of deterrence.¶ From this analysis, Lieber and Press draw two major implications for U.S. foreign policy: claims that it is impossible to attribute nuclear terrorism to particular groups or potential states sponsors undermines deterrence; and fear of states transferring nuclear weapons to terrorist groups, by itself, does not justify extreme measures to prevent nuclear proliferation.¶ This is a key point. While there are other reasons nuclear proliferation is undesirable, fears of nuclear terrorism have been used to justify a wide-range of policies—up to, and including, military action. Put in its proper perspective however—given the difficulty in constructing and transporting a nuclear device and the improbability of state transfer—**nuclear terrorism hardly warrants** the type of exertions many **alarmist assessments** indicate it should.

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#### CCP collapse is an independent extinction scenario

Rexing, 05 – Staff Writer (San, “The CCP’s Last Ditch Gamble: Biological and Nuclear War”, Epoch Times, 8/5, http://english.epochtimes.com/ news/5-8-5/30975.html)//VP

What, then, is the gist of this wild, last-ditch gamble? To put it in a few words: A cornered beast is fighting desperately to survive in a battle with humanity. If you don’t believe me, read some passages directly from the speeches. 1) “We must prepare ourselves for two scenarios. If our biological weapons succeed in the surprise attack [on the US], the Chinese people will be able to keep their losses at a minimum in the fight against the U.S. If, however, the attack fails and triggers a nuclear retaliation from the U.S., China would perhaps suffer a catastrophe in which more than half of its population would perish. That is why we need to be ready with air defense systems for our big and medium-sized cities. Whatever the case may be, we can only move forward fearlessly for the sake of our Party and state and our nation’s future, regardless of the hardships we have to face and the sacrifices we have to make. The population, even if more than half dies, can be reproduced. But if the Party falls, everything is gone, and forever gone!” 2) “In any event, we, the CCP, will never step down from the stage of history! We’d rather have the whole world, or even the entire globe, share life and death with us than step down from the stage of history!!! Isn’t there a ‘nuclear bondage’ theory? It means that since the nuclear weapons have bound the security of the entire world, all will die together if death is inevitable. In my view, there is another kind of bondage, and that is, the fate our Party is tied up with that of the whole world. If we, the CCP, are finished, China will be finished, and the world will be finished.” 3) “It is indeed brutal to kill one or two hundred million Americans. But that is the only path that will secure a Chinese century, a century in which the CCP leads the world. We, as revolutionary humanitarians, do not want deaths. But if history confronts us with a choice between deaths of Chinese and those of Americans, we’d have to pick the latter, as, for us, it is more important to safeguard the lives of the Chinese people and the life of our Party. That is because, after all, we are Chinese and members of the CCP. Since the day we joined the CCP, the Party’s life has always been above all else!” Since the Party’s life is “above all else,” it would not be surprising if the CCP resorts to the use of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons in its attempt to extend its life. The CCP, which disregards human life, would not hesitate to kill two hundred million Americans, along with seven or eight hundred million Chinese, to achieve its ends. These speeches let the public see the CCP for what it really is. With evil filling its every cell the CCP intends to wage a war against humankind in its desperate attempt to cling to life. That is the main theme of the speeches. This theme is murderous and utterly evil. In China we have seen beggars who coerced people to give them money by threatening to stab themselves with knives or pierce their throats with long nails. But we have never, until now, seen such a gangster who would use biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons to threaten the world, that all will die together with him. This bloody confession has confirmed the CCP’s nature: that of a monstrous murderer who has killed 80 million Chinese people and who now plans to hold one billion people hostage and gamble with their lives.